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The purpose of the thesis is to analyze the importance of sharing information 
when dealing with activities related to international terrorism in Latin America, 
especially in the aftermath of the terrorist events against the United States on September 
11, 2001. The importance of information on international terrorism is critical in the war 
against terrorism, particularly in the region due to the potential for those activities 
associated with the already existent organized crime. The importance of information 
includes organizations. Therefore, the proposed organizational process makes it possible 
to facilitate the sharing of information considering the complexity involved. At the same 
time, the necessity of information about the threat of terrorism can be demonstrated 
through the use of game theory. This model can drive the states to use all means 
necessary to obtain relevant information. The requirement for information sharing must 
be solved based on the relevance of the threats and the need for increased security for the 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE   
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the importance of sharing information 
when dealing with activities related to international terrorism in Latin America. Despite 
the fact that the region has endured a long period of terrorism and connected activities 
since the Cold War era, and still is experiencing some of the activities that are primarily 
linked to criminal activities, the circumstances have especially changed in the aftermath 
of the terrorist events against the United States on September 11, 2001 (9/11).  
The implications of international terrorism after those events attain a new position 
in terms of international relations, the nature, and relevance of the threats, and the priority 
placed on U.S. national security and on the states in the region. The effects of this 
asymmetric threat immediately generated a common response from the countries of the 
region as an attack on the region itself, expressed through the Organizations of American 
States (Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2001). The United Nations, as mentioned by its 
Secretary General Kofi Annan (2002), also condemned it, expressing that “terrorism is a 
global threat with global effects … its consequences affect every aspect of the United 
Nations agenda”. Therefore, the war on terrorism declared by the United States against 
that non-traditional enemy must include Latin America as a partner in fighting terrorism 
(Johnson 2001, Zedillo 2001). Nevertheless, international terrorism has different 
implications in the region because of the perception of this threat, which is not accorded 
the same priority in the region as demonstrated in the last meeting of the Ministers of 
Defense held on November 2004, in Quito, Ecuador (Lobe, Lucas, Shanker, 2004; 
Washington Office on Latin America, 2004).   
The importance of information on international terrorism seems to be obvious. 
Therefore, sharing information would be considered logical. However, it is not so simple. 
The term “information” means “facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form” 
(Military Dictionary DODa), and it can be applied to aspects of international terrorism. 
The term “intelligence” means “the product resulting from the collection, processing, 
integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning 
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foreign countries or areas” (Military Dictionary DODb). However, as mentioned by 
Dearth (1995), “Intelligence is many things to many people, depending upon their 
particular roles and perspectives” (p. 2). Somoza (2001) mentions that some definitions 
of intelligence consider knowledge, threat and decision (translation by the author) as the 
common elements of those definitions. The problem with definitions continues when 
dealing with terrorism. Ganor (2001), citing Schmidt and Youngman, analyzed 109 
different definitions on terrorism in which they found that violence appeared 83.5% of 
the time, political 65%, terror 51%, threats 47%, and physiological effects 41.5%, among 
the most important components of the definitions (pp. 1-2). Therefore, violence is the 
main component of terrorism regardless of its origin. The legal framework that prevails in 
the region is the Inter-American Convention against Terrorism (June 3, 2002), which 
“does not include a definition of terrorism or offense,” and refers to the already existent 
conventions to define offenses (Fitzgerald, 2002, p. 14).  
The problem of definition does not remain only at the scholastic level, especially 
when trying to share information in the region. Therefore, if considering previous 
definitions, the “raw material” in order to obtain intelligence would be information. If the 
information depends on the threat and if it is not defined, it is a problem. In addition, the 
problem increases when the security organizations in charge are not clearly identified and 
do not keep current to handle this threat, where some problems linked to police and 
judicial corruption exist, where a lack of coordination among countries continues, and in 
some cases where, “infiltration of security agencies by terrorists”, exists (Garrastazu & 
Haar, p. 3). Therefore, the results of the analysis can be easily imagined to be 
disadvantageous to the security forces, which incidentally, are in the process of 
identifying their new roles within the legacy of internal problems especially related to the 
intelligence services, which affect the regional unification efforts against international 
terrorism in the region. It is also important to mention the potential for terrorist activities 
in the region when linked with the already existent organized crime.  
Finally, the gap between the preparation of the attackers and the victim’s possible 
reaction leaves a small margin of error that requires a different approach when taking into 
account information about terrorism (Handel, 1995, pp. 221-224). If violence is the main 
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component of terrorism and has no limits (Laqueur, 2000, pp. 155-157), this violence will 
also have socio-political and physiological consequences of the highest order. 
Meanwhile, this “non-state war” continues, and increases their activities in the region 
(Manwaring, 2004, p. 26).   
B. BACKGROUND 
Mares (2001) considers the historical conditions of the region in terms of security 
as a “violent peace”. These conditions have profound implications when trying to 
establish a new security architecture for the Americas that can generate multilateral 
cooperation (Nuñez, 2002). This is the scenario in which international terrorism must be 
considered, and it needs to be based on the definition of “terrorism involving the citizens 
or property of more than one country” (Perl, 2004). The prior experience of terrorism in 
the region was linked to internal activities, and when external activities occurred, they 
were linked to a common ideological origin. However, the importance of alliances to 
combat a common threat currently constitutes a priority when dealing with international 
terrorism (White House, 2003). It becomes more critical because of the potential risk that 
such kinds of actions represent and the correspondent strategic implications as mentioned 
by Wilkinson (2000). It is then necessary to act against old paradigms and not only 
include defense related actions but diplomatic actions as well. 
The consolidation of democracy in the region is in transition, especially the 
institutions that include the security forces: the military and police. Under these 
circumstances, improvements in military civilian relations must continue because of the 
region’s increasing integration (Franko, 2000). While the region’s security problem is 
somehow implicit for all of society’s actors, the role of the security forces in the region is 
still extremely influential and is crucial in fighting against international terrorism. In 
addition, the region’s information systems depend directly or indirectly on those 
institutions, with a structure that was primarily oriented towards conventional threats, and 
in some cases, towards internal threats. The unorthodox use of that structure had 
generated not only internal problems with human rights in some countries but also an 
implicit lack of trust in international cooperation, especially with some countries 
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perceived as traditional enemies. Consequently, the states are obligated to regulate and 
professionalize this activity as a condition for efficiency and trust (Bruneau, 2000).     
The implications of an international terrorist act generated in the region will have 
serious implications on relations among the states, and primarily, if such an action is 
intended to affect U.S. interests. The information required to prevent such actions will be 
considered vital, and therefore, obtaining it will be considered a priority. In this case, 
cooperative intelligence activities among states play an important role because of the 
importance of local information to produce timely and efficient analyses in the potential 
target state.  
This general view is important to consider as a framework to understand the 
“establishment” of security in the region, especially when trying to share information to 
fight international terrorism and their associated problems. The same consideration 
applies to activities related to information about international terrorism from U.S. 
agencies and the international organizations in the region.   
C. METHODOLOGY AND CHAPTER REVIEW 
The analysis in this thesis is based on the hypothesis that information sharing is 
key in successfully combating international terrorism nets in the Americas. This requires 
seeking cooperation, regional agreements, and the sharing of intelligence. The thesis 
considers the nature of actions originating from a non-state enemy and the repercussions 
that could reach the tenet of a conventional war. The role of information, which is critical 
for any decision, reaches a new dimension when considering international terrorism 
because of its criticality to act quickly. This thesis intends to demonstrate the necessity to 
share information about international terrorism by using game theory. This procedure will 
consider the circumstances and could comprise reciprocal cooperation, the use of 
international organizations and agreements, and the use of special intelligence operations. 
Considering this, each activity will generate different outcomes and consequences that 
could affect regional relations and security among its states.  
The use of game theory to analyze the importance of information in relation to 
international terrorism does not pretend to be the solution to this problem but rather it 
intends to present a procedure that might facilitate understanding and the need to obtain 
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and share information in a complex environment. The thesis emphasizes the importance 
of sharing information when dealing with international terrorism regardless of the origin, 
which includes some links to existing traditional threats in the region. It also considers 
the importance of obtaining information, which can drive the activities of states to 
develop programs that thwart terrorism and enhance regional security.   
Chapter II examines international terrorism in the region and the traditional 
terrorist related activities with potential international repercussions already in existence. 
Chapter III considers the current status of international laws, international organizations, 
international agreements, and the organization of the security systems that prevail in the 
region. Chapter IV analyzes the existing structures in the region to deal with information 
focusing more on the organizations, the availability of information related to international 
terrorism, and the possibility of sharing information. Chapter V analyzes the necessity of 
information for defeating international terrorism using game theory. Finally, Chapter VI 
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II. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN THE REGION 
A. DEFINING THE THREATS IN THE REGION 
The importance of defining the threats is to establish a general background about 
the existent and perceived threats in the region so as to assess their importance in 
connection with international terrorism. The traditional threat was primarily based on the 
concept of national security, derived from the European geopolitical vision of space and 
resources. Therefore, the concept of threat was defined by that view, and thereby 
generated grievances among countries from the region (Child, 1990). The ideological 
struggle based on communism, primarily with internal effects, determined most of the 
security policies within the region. The end of the Cold War coincided with the 
consolidation of democracy in the region. Only a few remnants of the old ideological  
war exist, especially in Colombia and Peru. However, as cited by Schulz (2000) prior to 
9/11, according to Clinton’s National Security Strategy for a New Century, the “principal 
security concerns in the hemisphere today are transnational in nature, stemming from 
such activities as drug trafficking, organized crime, money laundering, illegal 
immigration, and terrorism” (p. 4).  
The characteristics of international terrorism as a threat after 9/11 go beyond the 
classical approach of international relations and security because “the reality is that 
internal and transnational non state actors can be as important as traditional nation-states” 
(Manwaring, 2004, p. 4). However, the problem increases when those new actors are not 
considered a threat and do not receive the proper attention.  
The attacks of 9/11 against the United States precipitated the response from a 
region that demonstrated a logical and unanimous solidarity against such an intolerable 
crime. Nevertheless, after the Cold War, democracy prevailed in the region and new 
concepts of integration derived from economic initiatives principally from the United 
States emerged. As a consequence, the region changed its traditional concept of defense 
against conventional threats towards a security approach, which encompasses the 
region’s new reality. The U.S. initiative for the region was to improve security 
institutions by accelerating the process through direct contact among the region’s 
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Ministers of Defense and by generating a new security architecture according to that new 
reality (Nuñez, 2002). Manwaring M., Fontela W., Grizzard M. and Rempe, D. (2003) 
analyze the problem of security in the region in terms that include not only the traditional 
concept of sovereignty but the new threats to security as well (pp. 3-16).  
Lemozy (2003) summarizes the regional perspective of threats generated during 
the Panel on Intelligence and New Threats organized by the Center of Hemispheric 
Studies in Santiago, Chile, on October 28-30, 2003. This Panel particularly mentioned, 
“International terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime as the main threats 
considered in the global security agenda” (Lemozy, p. 6) (Translation by the author). A 
similar position is held by SOUTHCOM which considers “narcoterrorism, gang violence, 
branches of Middle Eastern terrorist organizations [support activities]… and radical 
populism as another major concern in the region” (Hill, 2004). 
The perception of the threats in the region is described in the Declaration on 
Security in the Americas, during the Special Conference on Security from the 
Organization of American States, held in Mexico on October 28 (OAS, 2003). Chapter II, 
No. 4, lit. m. of that Declaration includes the actual threats considered in the region: 
• Terrorism, transnational crime, the global drug problem, corruption, asset 
laundering, illicit trafficking in weapons, and the connection among them; 
• Extreme poverty and social exclusion of broad sectors of the population, 
which also affect stability and democracy. Extreme poverty erodes social 
cohesion and undermines the security of states; 
• Natural and man-made disasters, HIV/AIDS and other diseases, other 
health risks, and environmental degradation; 
• Trafficking of people; 
• Attacks on cyber security; 
• The potential damage arising in the event of an accident or incident during 
the maritime transport of potentially hazardous material, including 
petroleum and radioactive materials and toxic waste; and  
• The possibility of access, possession, and use of weapons of mass 
destruction and their means of delivery by terrorists.  
This list represents the perceived threats in the region. Therefore, it is important to 
consider these threats to understand in context the importance of international terrorism 
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in the region. Otherwise, as mentioned by Manwaring (2004), “Latin American Countries 
perceive that the United States is going its own way in the Global War on Terrorism 
(GWOT)” (p. 1).      
Delgado (2003) considers it important to classify those activities, differentiating 
the ones originated through illicit activities such as terrorism, drug trafficking and so on, 
from those generated by socio-economic conditions or natural and environmental 
circumstances (p. 9). This division, helps in assigning responsibilities to the proper 
organizations, and to highlight the threat of international terrorism in the region. 
(Delgado, 2003, pp. 8-10., Sain, 2003., Sillone, 2003, pp. 3-6).  
In this regard, it is necessary to consider that the conventional threat of “external 
aggression [that] retains credibility, but not the urgency it once had” (Manwaring, 2004, 
p. 18). These considerations do not change the increased importance of sharing 
information about international terrorism. In this regard, it is important to consider 
Cilluffo (2000) who mentions that,  
The lines between organized crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism are 
quickly becoming blurred. It cannot be seen through a diplomacy, 
military, law enforcement, drug enforcement, or intelligence lens alone. It 
must be a prism of all these that offer a comprehensive and coordinated 
approach (p. 7).  
When considering information about international terrorism, it is not necessary to 
separate organized crime from terrorism, despite the fact that those activities pursue 
different goals. However, some circumstances as mentioned by Cilluffo (2000) could 
generate a “relationship mutually beneficial” (p. 1). Makarenko (2004) goes further and 
mentions that, “Weak or failed states foster the convergence between transnational 
organized crime and terrorism, and ultimately create a safe haven for the convergent 
groups” (p. 138).  
B. INTERNATIONAL THREATS RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL 
TERRORISM 
Trying to separate internal from external threats is becoming difficult in a global 
society where the players interact in many ways. However, the intention of this 
separation is to focus on the external activities associated with international terrorism. 
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When considering the transformation of conflict, Metz and Millen as cited by Manwaring 
(2004, p. 26), consider that the actual strategic-political wars consist of “1) direct 
interstate war, 2) nonstate war, 3) intrastate war, and 4) indirect interstate war”. From 
these, the nonstate war, and intrastate war are more likely to occur in the region. When 
considering the analysis of information about international terrorism, it is important to 
consider all the actors involved in these strategic-political wars, bearing in mind that each 
country or sub-region could play and would be affected in a different way.   
1. Intrastate Wars within the Region 
Subversion in the region was a clear threat identified by the communist struggle 
that was confronted with the prevailing paradigms of the Cold War. Metz and Millen 
(2004) mention that: 
21st-century insurgency is clearly a descendent of a similar phenomenon 
that blossomed in the golden age of insurgency in the second half of the 
20th century. At that time, many states in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and 
even or the periphery of Europe were ruled by weak, corrupt regimes, 
unpopular dictator, new fragile governments, or colonial occupiers. 
Socialist radicalism and nationalism inspired revolutionaries around the 
world and provided an ethical justification for political violence (p. 8).   
The existence of remnants of insurgence is evident in the region, especially in the 
Andeans, and exists as an insurgent potential in the region (Daly, 2004). The insurgency 
in Colombia is the main security concern of that country but its effects spillover into the 
entire region. The interaction between insurgents and illicit drug producers has generated 
pivotal support from the United States through the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) 
since 2000 (Sullivan, 2005). However, the events of 9/11 changed the definition of the 
threat with respect to terrorist groups in the region (Marcella, 2003, p. 34). This new 
concept of threat required a different approach from the United States for military aid to 
Colombia to support the government’s unified campaign against narcotics trafficking, 
terrorist activities, and other threats to its national security (Perl, 2004). The actual 
situation of the subversive groups, which now are included in the list of Foreign Terrorist 
organizations (FTO) by the Department of State include in Colombia, the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the 
paramilitary (AUC); and from Peru, the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path or SL), as the 
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most important in the region (Sullivan, 2005). In the region, the United States still 
considers Cuba a state that supports terrorism but with a passive or less active role (Perl, 
2004). In Central America, it is important to consider the Zapatista National 
Revolutionary Army (EZNL), which is the largest and most sophisticated insurgent group 
in Mexico. Its strategy is based on indigenous claims and in engaging the government in 
a prolonged process of negotiations. The group has earned itself the title of the “first post-
communist insurgency while its strategy has been characterized as social netwar” (Miro, 
2003, p. 35).  
An important consideration of revolutionary insurgency is that while an 
underground organization and procedures are maintained, those groups undergo a  
transmutation in ideology and partnership support, but that reflects the new “asymmetric 
Power Projection” to include the projection of terrorism with criminal links (Metz & 
Millen, 2004, pp. 11-14). In any case, it is important to consider that the use of terrorism 
by the insurgency constitutes another form of warfare widely used due to “its unique 
place in the universe of political violence” (Merari, 1993, p. 213). That violence receives 
different responses from the governments of the region.  
2. Non State Actors Linked with International Terrorism and 
International Crime in the Region 
The main actors associated with nonstate wars considered by Metz and Millen, 
include “Criminal and terrorist [groups] that thrive among various host states and use 
…terrorist and insurgency methods to maintain freedom of movement and their own 
security. The al Qaida terrorist network is an example” (As cited by Manwaring 2004, p. 
26). Criminal actions are pretty well defined and somehow worked out by the current 
internal and international law in the region. However, when actions become terrorism, 
they are noticeably identified within each country, based on the effects of such actions. 
The actors associated with that kind of threat are not considered in the same way in each 
country and international law to define such actions does not exist (Fitzgerald, 2002, pp. 
13-15). 
a. International Terrorism 
The importance of international terrorism and its related activities varies in 
each sub-region. In the Caribbean, the main concern during the Cold War was the Cuban-
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Soviet threat. After 9/11, the financial support of terrorist activities and its connection to 
drug related activities became a priority (Sullivan, 2004). Central America is not 
considered an active region for international terrorism despite the fact that it is considered 
a safe haven for political activities of extremist organizations and latent subversion exists 
in some rural areas. However, persistent concern exists about the presence of members of 
international terrorist organizations associated with the Middle East who may try to 
recruit members and cross the border into the United States (Rodriguez, 2004). In the 
Andean region, the main concern has been the relationship between internal and 
international drug traders, and occasionally, the presence of external actors associated 
with subversive groups (Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2001). The Southern cone 
experienced international terrorism connected with the Middle East in the Tri Border 
Area (TBA) through the presence of groups like Hamas and Hezbollah. The 1992 
bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires, and the 1994 bombing of the Argentine-
Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA), demonstrate an example of this presence (Sullivan, 
2004, pp. 9-10).  
The presence of international terrorism associated with the Middle East 
generated great concern, but only after 9/11, when some connections to certain members 
of al Qaida with the region were established (Blanche, 2003, Daly, 2003, Westerman, 
2002). The range of activities of the international terrorist groups that operate in different 
countries has increased the apprehension of the region’s governments due to those 
group’s potential and the difficulty in tracking their activities. Only limited activities are 
known to be related to international terrorism, but the region has increasingly established 
new evidence of the presence of terrorists in different places of the region. The main 
concern relevant to the purpose of this thesis, refers to the information available on this 
threat in the region prior to 9/11, and the existing information about potential activities in 
the entire region, considering that “one-third of the terrorist organizations operating 
worldwide, including one linked to Osama bin Laden, located or operate in Latin 
America” (Johnson, 2001).  
Takeyh, Ray and Gvosdev (2002) mention that “the objectives of terrorist 
organizations such as Al Qaida and the Symbiotic organized-crime networks that help 
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sustain these groups are not confined territorially or ideological to a particular region” (p. 
97). The terrorist network will operate where necessary according to the circumstances, 
especially in areas that are not expected to be affected by terrorism or that are not familiar 
with such activities. According to Levitt (2002b), “Cracking down on terrorist financing 
will only succeed in dismantling terrorist groups’ logistical and financial support 
networks and by extension preventing terrorist attacks”.    
Terrorism is not limited to traditional means of violence. The actions and 
capabilities of the counterterrorist forces obligate the terrorist groups to innovate. Jackson 
(2001) mentions, “for groups seeking legitimacy and respect in today’s technological 
advanced world, the sophistication of a groups´ attack can be of utmost importance” (p. 
185). The use of “innovation applied to terrorist groups can take different meanings 
across the spectrum of technology acquisition activities” (Jackson, 2001, p. 203). In this 
aspect, Crenshaw (2001) considers that it can refer not only to technological but also to 
organizational innovations, which include improvements in the terror network as well as 
new areas of operation.   
b. International Crime – Terrorist Related Activities 
When analyzing international terrorism in the region, illicit activities are 
the common factor when describing this kind of threat. Terrorism definitely has changed 
from the 1970’s and the same has happened with traditional organized crime, which was 
identified with the classical mafias, “both activities have exploited the change in the 
international environment and, more importantly, they have overlapped to a degree 
unimaginable prior to 1990” (Jane’s, 2000). 
Fersuson (2002) considers that organized crime “remains a major 
transnational as well as national problem for the Western hemisphere”, especially 
because of the economic resources and the illegal trade linked with drugs and arms (p. 2). 
Ferguson (2002) also observes that the problems that affect the region “are tied to the 
issue of tran boundary effects, or to uncontrolled transnational activities and effects, 
where international organized criminal groups and illicit forms of trade cross national 
boundaries with considerable ease” (p. 3).   
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The risk increases not only because a nexus with international terrorism 
can occur, but also because the traditional “paths and means” to reach the continental 
United States that already exist and are used for illegal activities, can be used by extra-
regional international terrorists (Islamic), even though those actions supposedly 
contradict the interests of traditional crime. Related to this, Ronquillo (2005) mentions 
the possible relationship of criminal gangs from Central America that have connections 
with the United States, and are suspected of having some links to Middle East terrorism. 
The importance of terrorism in Colombia and the impact for the region is analyzed by 
Laqueur (2003). He considers the relationship between terrorism and other illegal 
activities and states that the “FARC and ELP ideology is the struggle against government 
corruption, but the presence of so much money in the hands of the terrorists is bound to 
create similar problems” (p. 206).  
According to Shelley (2003), “The phenomenon of transnational crime, 
terrorism, and corruption are all too often viewed as separate, and they grow in tandem 
with the economic and political conditions” (p. 302). This is the predominant reality in 
the region where subversion and drugs intensify that problem causing an increasing gap 
between the resources available to the State and those available to the outlaws (Shelley, 
2003).  
The new tendency globally, and particularly in the region, is to consider 
that relationship. Tamara Makarenko, has considered this link and mentions it as a 
“Crime-Terror Continuum” (2004, p. 129). That relationship can be represented to 
generate a model of a relationship that includes alliances, operational motivations, and 
possible convergence besides including the “Black Hole” thesis that represents the 
possible failure of the state as a final consequence (Makarenko, 2001, 2003, 2004). 
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III. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND 
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN LATIN AMERICA 
A. THE UNITED NATIONS (UN) AND TERRORISM 
1. The General Assembly 
According to the United Nations (UN, 2004a) “terrorism has been a concern to 
the international community since 1937 when the League of Nations elaborated the 
convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism”. The United Nations has 
established “12 major multilateral conventions and protocols related to states 
responsibilities for terrorism” and some additional resolutions through the Security 
Council and General Assembly on “specific incidents” (UN, 2004b). However, Peterson 
(2003) observes that a common discussion in the General Assembly among the states 
refers to the “inability to agree on a common definition about, terrorism, terrorist acts, 
and international terrorism” (p. 177). Attitudes are deeply divided because of the 
implications a single definition represents. 
This is important to consider because the internal, regional, and global 
motivations for generating terrorism has had a series of political, military, and diplomatic 
implications (Mani, 2003). A different approach exists between the General Assembly 
and the Security Council that is important to consider, the “Assembly resolutions 
emphasize treating terrorism as a form of transnational crime to be suppressed through 
policing while council resolutions treat terrorism as a security question” (Peterson, 2003, 
p. 183). Mani (2003) mentions that “the General Assembly ceded its place to the Security 
Council in addressing terrorism”, and that the “significant point of departure was the 
assembly’s 1994 resolution 60, Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International 
Terrorism”, which concluded the “Defense of Non-State Terrorism” (p. 223). Those 
“measures to eliminate” terrorism demonstrated the need to “develop national and 
international legal rules adequate to suppressing terrorism”, and the Assembly established 




2. The Security Council 
According to Oudraat (2003), international terrorism “was placed on the Security 
Council’s agenda in the early 1990s”, and states that “On January 31, 1992, at the 
Council’s first-ever meeting of heads of state and government, the members of the 
council expressed their deep concern over acts of international terrorism and emphasized 
the need for the international community to deal effectively with all such acts” (p. 151). 
Oudraat (2003) also observes that the United States was particularly interested “after the 
bombings of its embassies in East Africa,” and that U.S. President Bill Clinton in the 
General Assembly in 1998 “placed the fight against terrorism at the top of the United 
States agenda” (Oudraat, p. 151). In 1999, the “Security Council recognized international 
terrorism as a threat to international peace and security and strongly condemned all such 
acts in resolution 1269” (Oudraat, 2003, p. 151). 
Oudraat (2003) observes that a great concern of the United States and the Security 
Council was motivated by five tendencies (pp. 151-152): 
• An increasing proportion of terrorist attacks against U.S. facilities and 
citizens 
• The average number of casualties per incident increased 
• Terrorist groups seemed to be operating as part of a global network. 
• Fears that terrorism might one day use chemical, biological, or nuclear 
weapons were increasing 
• The United States was, and is, particularly concerned by the role that 
certain states play in supporting and sponsoring terrorism 
The UN Security Council resolutions linked to international terrorism included 
economic sanctions against Libya in 1992, Sudan in 1996, and Afghanistan in 1999. 
Those actions demonstrated the importance of multilateral responses and facilitated the 
rapid response after the events of September 11, 2001, in the United States. This was 
accomplished with “two resolutions particularly important, resolution 1868 of September 
12 [that] legitimized militarized action against terrorism [and] resolutions 1363 of 
September 28, 2001, broaden the scope of international responses” (Oudraat, 2003, pp. 
153-158). Schrijver (2003) observes that “Resolution 1373 was the first legally binding 
Security Council resolution addressing international terrorism as a global phenomenon 
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without referring to a particular state or region” (p. 58). The common theme in all the 
resolutions emphasizes the threat represented by international terrorism, and the 
importance of a lawful response and respect for human rights. In addition, it considers the 
importance of cooperation and the sharing of information among the states on this issue. 
The General Assembly resolutions of December 1999 and December 2001, 
mention “to intensify, as and where appropriate, the exchange of information of facts 
related to terrorism and, in so doing, to avoid the dissemination of inaccurate or 
unverified information” (UN, General Assembly, 2000). The Report by the Chair of the 
Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) on the problems encountered in the implementation 
of Security Council resolutions 1373 and 1456, addresses that these “resolutions had 
established the intimate link between the fight against terrorism and other priorities of the 
United Nations” (UN, Security Council, S/2004/70). The Report also emphasizes the 
importance of liaison activities with international and regional organizations, especially 
for technical assistance, and mentions when referring to WMD and trans-national 
organized crime that “CTC has shown that anti-terrorism measures related to those fields 
is interrelated to-and inseparable–from anti-terrorism measures under the Resolution” 
(UN, Security Council, S/2004/70).  
The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1535 on March 26, 2004, in which 
it decides to revitalize the Counter-Terrorism Committee, assisted by a Committee 
Executive Directorate (CTED), with the intent to “enhance the Committee’s ability to 
monitor the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001)” (UN, Security Council, 
S/RES/1535, 2004). In this regard, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1566 on 
October 8, 2004, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, which 
condemns terrorism and establishes in art. 6 “Calls upon relevant international, regional 
and sub regional organizations to strengthen international cooperation in the fight against 
terrorism and to intensify their interaction with the UN and in particular with the CTC” 
(UN, Security Council, S/RES/1566, 2004). Resolution 1566 includes an activity that is 
innovative and establishes the resolution’s nature of enforcement as mentioned in article 
8: 
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Directs the CTC, as matter of priority and, when appropriate, in close 
cooperation with the relevant international, regional and sub regional 
organizations to start visits to States, with the consent of the States 
concerned, in order to enhance the monitoring of the implementation of 
resolution 1373 (2001) and facilitate the provision of technical and other 
assistance for such implementation (UN, Security Council, S/RES/1566, 
2004).     
The reference to UN resolutions against international terrorism is very important 
because it establishes a legal framework to support the actions of the states and the 
international and regional organizations confronting international terrorism. This 
reference permits visualizing the spectrum of possible actions that the UN or the affected 
states can assume considering the importance that such kinds of actions can represent for 
the security of the states.  
These resolutions generates new responsibilities for the states and regional 
organizations related to international terrorism that must be considered. In addition, it 
demonstrates the importance of establishing a basic network of cooperation especially for 
sharing information on this threat in order to facilitate the actions and avoid false 
perceptions that would lead the international organizations and the states to make wrong 
decisions. Thus, they are obligated to act with all the organizations dealing with 
international terrorism or their related activities such as the Counter Terrorism 
Committee (CTC), the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF), International Atomic Energy (IAEA), and INTERPOL, among the 
most important.  
B. THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS) AND 
TERRORISM 
1. The OAS Response to International Terrorism 
Fitzgerald (2002), observes that the OAS “has always been on the forefront of 
issues regarding terrorism, [and that the attacks against the US on September 11], 
heightened the necessity to address this issue,” and mentions that “as early as the 
beginning of the 1970’s the OAS was involved with confronting the problem of terrorism 
and its effects on OAS members” (p. 2). The first Inter-American Specialized Conference 
on Terrorism in Lima, Peru, in 1996, adopted “the Declaration and the Plan of Action on 
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Hemispheric Cooperation to Prevent, Combat, and Eliminate Terrorism” (OAS, 1999). 
The Second Conference held in Mar del Plata, Argentina, set the basis for the creation of 
the Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE), and considered among other resolutions “to 
transmit to CICTE, for implementation, as the Directory of Competences for the 
Prevention, Combating, and Elimination of Terrorism, and the Inter-American Database 
on Terrorism, as well as the establishment of a framework for technical cooperation” 
(OAS, 1998). The OAS General Assembly through resolution AG/RES. 1650 formally 
established the CICTE on June 7, 1999 (OAS, 1999). The first regular meeting of the 
CICTE was held in October 1999, and no session was held in 2000. However, the events 
of September 11, 2001, in the United States “force the CICTE to renew and strengthen its 
anti-terrorism position” and “two special sessions on October 15 and November 29, 
2001” were held (Fitzgerald, 2002). According to the OAS mandate, the mission of the 
CICTE is to serve “for the coordination of efforts to protect the citizens of the member 
nations from the scourges of terrorism. Functioning through the exchange of information 
amongst the preeminent leaders, subject matter experts and decision makers work 
together to strengthen hemispheric solidarity and security” (OAS, 2002).  
Among other considerations, Article 28 of the Statute of the CICTE mentions the 
importance: 
To create an inter-American network for gathering and transmitting data 
via the competent national authorities designed to exchange information 
and experiences with the activities or persons, groups, organizations, and 
movements linked to terrorist acts as well as with the methods, sources of 
finance and entities directly or indirectly protecting or supporting them, 
and their possible links to other crimes, including the creation of an inter-
American database on terrorism issues that will be at the disposal of 
Member States (Fitzgerald, 2002, p. 5).  
It is important to consider that the “CICTE was conceived in the mid-1990’s in 
the wake of the twin bombings in Buenos Aires, Argentina in 1992 and 1994” and 






2. The OAS Response after the Events of September 11, 2001 
The most important resolutions after 9/11 were made during the Meeting of 
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the region on September 21, 2001, and 
more significantly, because the states invoked the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal 
Assistance, the Rio Treaty, as an unprecedented response to the U.S. terrorist attacks 10 
days earlier (Fitzgerald, 2002, p. 7). Furthermore, during that meeting, the states passed a 
resolution “Strengthening Hemispheric Cooperation to Prevent, Combat, and Eliminate 
Terrorism” (OAS, 2001). In that meeting, in addition to condemning those attacks that 
took place in the United States, it recognizes “the inherent right of individual and 
collective self-defense in accordance with the Charters of the Organization of American 
States and the United Nations” (OAS, 2001). This resolution reflects an unprecedented 
procedure of invoking the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, the Rio Treaty, which 
demonstrated that it is still important to respond to terrorist attacks (Grossman, 2003). 
Noriega (2003) observes, “Our experience since September 11, 2001, in mobilizing 
hemispheric support and response to fight terrorism under the OAS Charter and Rio 
Treaty proves that the current hemispheric structure can address the region’s essential 
security needs”. 
On June 3, 2002, the OAS General Assembly passed the resolution adopting the 
“Inter-American Convention against Terrorism” (Fitzgerald, 2002, p. 14). That resolution 
mentions some “international cooperative obligations”, which deal with border control, 
training, and cooperation among law enforcement authorities, and improve 
communications “between the competent authorities in order to facilitate the secure and 
rapid exchange of information concerning all aspects of the offenses established in the 
international instrument” (Fitzgerald, 2002, p. 16). 
The final document that constitutes the basis for a security matter in the region is 
the “Declaration on Security in the Americas” adopted in the third plenary session in 
Mexico, which includes international terrorism as a threat to the region (OAS, 2003). 
According to the OAS Secretary General it “adopted a multidimensional approach 
adopted in Barbados, which recognizes that many of the new threats, concerns, and other 
challenges to hemispheric security are transnational in nature and require international 
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cooperation” (Gaviria, 2004). Noriega (2003) summarizes the effects of these threats in 
the region when he mentions, “terrorism, illicit trafficking in arms, narcotics and 
precursor chemicals, attacks on critical infrastructure and transnational criminal 
enterprises threaten democracy and undermine the security and prosperity of our citizens 
in too many of our states”.  
3. International Cooperation 
From a security perspective, “A dilemma of combating terrorism in a democratic 
society is finding the right balance between civil liberties and civil security” (Devost, 
Houghton and Pollard, 2002). This dilemma involves the implementation of the already 
existent agreements and the activities of the organizations that deal with international 
terrorism and related activities in the region. Any decision must consider the political 
implications and the consequences that represent a confrontation against that kind of 
threat for every state considering that international terrorism is not necessarily a priority 
for most of the countries in the region.  
Terrorism and international crime can also affect economic integration. Such was 
the case when MERCOSUR was established, and given the importance of the Tri border 
Area (TBA), Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and the United States decided to create a 
Counterterrorism Group “3+1” with the goal of increasing cooperation, exchanging 
information and cooperating in law enforcement” in that region (Department of State, 
2003). Similar agreements about narcotics have been reached in the Caribbean, in the 
Andean region, and the same requirement was necessary for NAFTA agreements. Some 
of the organizations that could be considered for specific situations with activities related 
to this threat include the Inter American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), the 
Consultative Committee of the Inter American Convention against the Illicit 
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other 
Related Materials (CIFTA), the Inter American Telecommunication Commission 
(CITEL), the South American Actions Task Force (GAFISID), and the Caribbean 
Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), among the most important. In addition, it is  
 22
significant to mention the cooperation that the states must have with the United States 
regardless of any consideration since it constitutes the main target state for international 
terrorist activities.  
Similarly, the UN and the OAS respond to international terrorism, because of 
their opposition to international terrorist actions. Both organizations, through their 
correspondent General Assemblies, reject such kinds of actions with unanimous political 
support. The main difference is in the enforcement of any decision. The UN has the 
Security Council to enforce a resolution. On the other hand, the OAS, even though it 
evoked the Rio Treaty in the case of the terrorist acts against the United States in 2001, it 
does not have a clear instrument to act against such threats. The resolutions of the UN 
Security Council in evoking Charter VII of the United Nations, especially concerning the 
role of the CTC, will obligate it to actualize the OAS resolutions. However, the character 
of enforcement or at least control, in order to implement Resolution 1337 (UN, Security 
Council, S/RES/1566, 2004), will require that the states and the security agencies 
encompass this new reality, which requires identifying international terrorism according 
to the potential threat it represents to the international community. Therefore, it is 
necessary to develop a common response based on what such a threat represents, which 
must include the study and control of this threat and their related activities due to the 
repercussions on the security of the states. The states of the region need to recognize that 
the threat that represents an international terrorist action could obligate the potentially 
affected state to act as it were an external aggression. Therefore, the basic action that any 
state must fulfill is the requirement to share information about this possible activity. 
Thus, the exchange of information about this kind of threat becomes a priority because of 
what it represents to the potential target state, bearing in mind that the state will use any 
means necessary to obtain that information. At the same time, this information will be 
used to support any decision under the existing international legal framework, and the 
way in which that information is received will avoid misinterpretations, facilitate the 
making of decisions, and the prosecution of terrorism. 
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Problems of coordination persist despite the relevance of terrorism to the security 
of the states of the region and to the concerns of the international organizations, and the 
drive to create new organizations and agreements in order to share information about 
international terrorism. The lack of a common definition and priority about this sort of 
threat makes it difficult to cooperate and share information among the states of the region 
and their security organizations. Therefore, it is necessary to expedite the development of 
a procedure for sharing information among the states in order to exploit the existing 
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IV. IMPORTANCE OF AN INFORMATION ORGANIZATION-PROCESS 
STRUCTURE TO SHARE INFORMATION ABOUT 
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN LATIN AMERICA 
A. IMPORTANCE OF INFORMATION  
The role of intelligence in any kind of war is basic, it is even more important 
when referring to terrorism. In the United States, the existing structure against traditional 
threats failed and after the events of 9/11, forced a complete restructuring of the system, 
was undertaken. The problem associated with this threat increases in the region when 
international terrorism is not considered a priority. However, the relationship between 
terrorism and criminal activities represent a real threat to the state where those activities 
are present. Defense related scholars and security chiefs must consider the effects that 
terrorism have on security so as to study such a threat as a danger to the existence of the 
states and to the region’s on-going process of economic integration. The circumstances 
created by terrorism require a different approach to generate cooperation within the states 
of the region including all the sub regional and international organizations. This 
cooperation in terms of security must consider the importance of developing legal 
agreements to secure political and legal support, including the correspondent oversight 
that guarantees to expedite procedures required to deal with such a threat.   
1.  The Importance of Information in the War on Terrorism in Latin 
America 
As a result of the history in the region, the potential of today’s new terrorism is 
not fully appreciated nor are there adequate security structures available to prevent 
terrorist attacks. Therefore, international terrorist organizations and their related activities 
could increase their presence with the corresponding effects on society and become more 
difficult to confront later.   
When considering the importance of intelligence, Russell (2003a) observes that in 
many countries of Latin America, there is a “devolution of national strategic intelligence” 
(p. 3), and that there is an increase in operational intelligence. Besides, Kenney (2003) 
when mentioning intelligence against the “drug trafficking enterprises”, considers the 
importance of timely, reliable, and accurate information, critical for operations and legal 
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purposes (pp. 212-214). In any case, as mentioned by Treverton (2005), there are at least 
three types of intelligence, tactical, operative, and strategic, but “interestingly, 
transnational issues – organized crime, narcotics, terrorism, and weapon proliferation – 
run across the three types” (p. 23).  
This is particularly important in the region because of the activities of the main 
terrorism group with international projections, the FARC from Colombia which is 
supposed to have a “Marxist Leninist ideology”; an ideology that “is used mainly as a 
glue to hold the organization together and to indoctrinate new recruits, and does not play 
a significant role in the formation of their policy” (Janes, 2005, p. 2). Therefore, the 
activities must be understood in that context especially when those actions affect not only 
the neighboring countries but also the entire region (Millet, 2002). The motivation of 
those groups also must be understood, so the potential activities linked with those groups 
could be paid the proper attention at the corresponding level of analysis in each state of 
the region. 
2. The Importance of Information in the War on Terror 
The terrorist attack of 9/11 against the United States was a surprise to the defense 
leaders and to the intelligence community (IC). The initial blame for the events of 9/11 
was directed against the intelligence community. The result was a restructuring of the IC 
that included not only the structure but also procedures, doctrine, and priorities (Verton, 
2003, pp. 165-191).  
According to Jackson (2001), “the potential for international cooperation among 
terrorist groups for operational or ideological reasons has long been a focus of interest” 
(p. 199). Parachini (2003) mentions that the FARC among other groups, especially those 
which are supposed to pursue political goals, “political vision, practical military utility, 
and moral codes all restrained them in part from seeking and using unconventional 
weapons” (p. 45). This could be the case for this organization and even for the particular 
interest of continuing their profitable illicit activities, but it may not be the case for other 
terrorist organizations with other motivations, which can use criminal organizations or 
theirs members to employ unconventional weapons. The criminal activities and the actual  
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criminal networks existent in the region could facilitate the objectives of a terrorist group 
due to the varied regional and intercontinental transportation nets  that  terminate in the 
United States.    
Crenshaw (1988) mentions that “terrorism is par excellence a strategy of surprise; 
necessary for small groups who must thereby compensate for weakness in numbers and 
destructive capability” (p. 14). Therefore, “the existence of opportunities for a surprise 
attack may generate a political incentive for terrorism where none existed before” 
(Crenshaw, 1988, p. 14).        
The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (White House, 2003) mentions 
that the identified enemy requires a common effort where intelligence constitutes an 
essential component in order to prevail by using any means possible, and considers the 
importance of international cooperation. It encourages the Intelligence Community “to 
expand and improve relations with their foreign counterparts in an effort to take better 
advantage of their source reporting”. In addition, it states, “America will focus decisive 
military power and specialized intelligence resources to defeat terrorist networks 
globally” (White House, 2003, p. 17).  
When Byman and El Baradei (2003) analyze the War on Terrorism, they consider 
that the terrorist events of al Qaeda have generated a global intelligence operation against 
this terrorist group, and that regardless of the capacity of the police and intelligence 
services, intelligence operations have become a priority. Nevertheless, the traditional 
efforts of the intelligence services do not consider international terrorism a priority in 
Latin America. The initial intent of sharing information in the region is primarily due to a 
particular interest especially from the United States, and since it is required by 
international agreements, the act of sharing information to fight against international 
terrorism as a coordinated activity is still an ongoing goal.   
3. The Importance of Sharing Information about International 
Terrorism in the Region 
The information available in the security agencies on international terrorism needs 
to be handled differently because, in essence, it identifies a real threat to the target state. 
Lefebvre (2003) when mentioning the “difficulties and dilemmas of International 
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Intelligence Cooperation” refers to the reasons and restraints on cooperation that are 
important to analyze, when considering the situation in Latin America. Among the 
reasons, Lefebvre (2003) mentions that “no one agency can do and know everything” (p. 
534), and that is especially important when dealing with international terrorism. The best 
cooperation can be obtained when the benefits of such cooperation are evident for all 
parties and the risks demanded are fully understood. In addition, these activities may 
serve to fulfill some limitations existing in certain areas (Lefebvre, 2003). Therefore, 
cooperation constitutes a priority and it is different in each country and sub-region due to 
particular necessities that demand bilateral and common agreements to confront those 
kinds of threats. The bilateral agreements between the countries of the Andean Region 
and the Multilateral Agreements in the Caribbean and the South Cone constitute some 
examples. 
Lefebvre (2003) also observes some limitations that restrain cooperation among 
the states which are particularly sensible in the region such as the different perceptions of 
the threat, the distribution of power, the records on Human Rights, and some legal issues 
(pp. 534-535). Those conditions must be considered when seeking cooperation on 
security and the sharing of information concerning international terrorism. In this regard, 
Clough (2004) also considers the importance of having a second opinion and sharing 
“ideas and concepts with someone from a different nation, but with the same 
responsibilities, will always be advantageous, either to reinforce theories or to avoid 
narrow thinking” (p. 605).  
The need for information about the new threats has been analyzed in the region 
through various conferences promoted by the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, 
considering the role of intelligence within the security structure of each state and the 
necessity of an increasing participation of civilians in defense matters. The recent events 
of international terrorism increased the necessity for coordination and sharing of 
information that is critical. As an example Wishart (2002), when considering the 
importance of the intelligence networks in the Tri Border area of South America,  
emphasizes the role that MERCOSUR can represent for multilateral cooperation even 
with the United States.   
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4. A Proposed Organization-Process to Share Information in the Region 
a. The Actual Structure-Process for Sharing Information in the 
Region 
Salazar (2002), when considering the importance of transforming the 
United States IC, observes that “terrorism, drug trafficking and the proliferation of WMD 
represent the predominant threats”, and that the war on terrorism includes those 
transnational threats such as drug trafficking in the region that “provide funds for 
terrorists organizations that target America” (pp. 252-253). Therefore, the importance of 
information about the threat is based on the organization that can obtain and share 
information through international cooperation. According to Russell (2003b), most of the 
intelligence structures in Latin America were oriented to support domestic political 
concerns more than serious external threats to the state. The new discussion about the 
role of intelligence at the regional level has been promoted by the Center for Hemispheric 
Studies since 1997 and still is a topic of study (Russell, 2003b). The main concern in civil 
society within Latin America has been the control of the intelligence services by society 
and the correspondent oversight (Bruneau, 2000, Ugarte, 2002), and about the 
professionalism of that activity in the region (Russell and Lemozy, 2002). The role of the 
intelligence services in relation to the new democratic scenario in the region is 
improving. However, when considering international terrorism, the actual conditions 
increase the possibilities for terrorists to act in the region. Chiri (2002), when considering 
the importance of intelligence in the Americas and the importance of “moving beyond 
old paradigms”, mentions that three elements are predominant in confronting the 
intelligence systems of the countries of the region. “First, new forces that threaten 
national and international stability, such as terrorism and transnational criminal activity, 
second the revolution in information technology, which impacts upon the economic 
environment and influences the intelligence process, third, the interrelationship between 
intelligence and politics” (p. 1). These circumstances in the security structure of the 
region could result in surprise due to a failure of intelligence as occurred in the United 
States (Porch and Wirtz, 2002). Therefore, the regional states where international 
terrorism begins need to increase their strategic vision about the capacity of the threat and 
the repercussions of failing to cooperate. 
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b. Proposed Organization to Share Information about International 
Terrorism and Related or Potential Activities  
When trying to consider new intelligence structures in the region to 
support activities against international terrorism, it is vital to consider that more than the 
structure itself, it is important that the process and the conditions allow information to be 
shared. The information environment in the region is complex because it includes 
different sub regions that geographically and historically do not share common interests 
(Dominguez, 1998). Under these conditions, the structure of the security organizations 
must follow the requirement of each state, but at the same time, it is important to count 
on a process to share information that includes the complete spectrum of activities of 
terrorism in the region. 
According to Daft (2001), the structure that can be used to meet the 
requirements of a complex and unstable environment, such as the case of the region, is a 
matrix structure. It allows the necessary coordination to satisfy the necessity of 
information and easy sharing of resources, especially personnel (Daft, 2001, p. 47), see 
Figure 1. According to Daft (2001), “the matrix is a strong form of horizontal linkage,” 
and the characteristics of this structure make it possible to consider that information 
about international terrorism that is required by a particular security organization is also 
correlated with the need of information from a specific sub region or state. Daft (2001) 
also considers that some requirements are necessary to adopt this structure. The first is 
the necessity to share resources such as personnel and equipment, the second is to have 
dual authority when necessary, or mutual channels of cooperation, and the final 




Figure 1.   Organization-Process Model for Sharing Information about International 
Terrorism in Latin America. After (Daft, 2001, p. 46, Dual- Authority Structure in 
a Matrix Organization). The structure considers different organizations that could 
belong to a specific region or act independently. 
 
The proposed Organization-Process Model for sharing information about 
international terrorism considers the environment of the region and all regional and 
international organizations. The organization-process is not based on structure, which of 
course, but uses the actual systems to emphasize the processes more than on the structure. 
The requirement of information from a particular sub region or security organizations that 
deal with international terrorism, will maintain an appropriate dynamic to the 
organization-process motivated by their own interests. It is important to consider that a 
legal framework and the corresponding agreements facilitate the process and 
collaboration among the agencies within the countries and the sub regions.  
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The proposed Organization-Process Model for sharing information about 
international terrorism is based on a “matrix organization structure”, which has some 
characteristics that are important to consider when dealing with the problem and also has 
particular “strengths and weaknesses” that must be considered (Daft, 2001, p. 47).  
c. Strengths.  Refer to Figure 1 
(1) “Achieves coordination necessary to meet dual demands of 
customers” (Daft, 2001, pp. 47-48). This is important because each sub region has 
particular interests with respect to the threat that international terrorism represents. At the 
same time, the internal, regional, and international organizations that deal with the 
problem have their own priorities. Those demands could be overcome with this structure. 
(2) “Flexible sharing of human resources across products 
[organizations that deal with the threat]” (Daft, 2001, pp. 47-48). The characteristic of the 
threat with an ample range of criminal-terrorist activities requires mutual support in 
specialized personnel and technology. The case of WMD, global illegal finances, legal 
support, cyber crime, small weapons trafficking, narcotics, and international crime and so 
on, can be considered examples of required cooperation and support among the states and 
sub regions, especially when considering the relationship with international terrorist 
activities that have the potential to affect the security of the states and their external 
relations. 
(3) “Suited to complex decisions and frequent changes in an 
unstable environment” (Daft, 2001, pp. 47-48). This is important in the region because 
the socio political conditions in the region generate instability in some particular states or 
circumstances. Therefore, the Organization-Process Model permits a continuum of 
proceedings from the other sub regions and organizations that deal with international 
terrorism or their linked activities to be suitable to make coordinated decisions. 
International agreements would facilitate this activity.  
(4) “Provides opportunity for both functional and product skill 
development” (Daft, 2001, pp. 47-48). The Organization-Process Structure allows for 
increasing the knowledge about the threat to all states. Additionally the internal, regional, 
and international organizations could increase their capacity with the structure that allows  
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exchanging experiences, knowledge, and information. This circumstance, in the long 
term, will improve the relationship among the individuals and organizations, generating 
conditions for common trust.    
d. Weaknesses. Refer to Figure 1 
(1) “Causes participants to experience dual authority, which 
can be frustrating and confusing” (Daft, 2001, pp. 47-48). This can be a problem because 
the Organization-Process requires a flow of activities and it can be halted or delayed at 
multiple points in the process. Therefore, normal cooperation could end.   
(2) “Means participants need good interpersonal skills and 
extensive training” (Daft, 2001, pp. 47-48). This is a limitation because the capacity of 
the personnel and the assets usually differ in each region or security organization, which 
limits the activities. The limitations increase when there is no established security 
structure in the state or proper oversight that facilitates the operation at an international 
level. 
(3) “Will not work unless participants understand it and adopt 
collegial rather than vertical-type relationships” (Daft, 2001, pp. 47-48).  This 
organization does not follow the traditional vertical and hierarchical structures that 
characterize the security organizations of the region. Rather, it is a “horizontal 
organization” that generates “horizontal linkages” (Daft, 2001, pp. 36-37). The 
organization will not work unless a common agreement and established procedures exist 
based on the local and international agreements, and on the appropriate internal control 
that permits the sharing of information in a timely matter.  
(4) “Requires great effort to maintain power balance” (Daft, 
2001, pp. 47-48).  The structure facilitates multiple relationships among all the 
organizations and regions. This represents a dilemma in terms of authority and hierarchy. 
Effectiveness depends on relationships but still requires a clear foundation based on a 
legal framework and proper oversight of the process.  
Limitations that hinder horizontal linkages within the organization, 
they can be solved by the use of “information systems” and “direct contact,” and even 
assigning personnel to the “liaison role” (Daft, 2001, p. 37), refer to Figure 1. Another 
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option when direct contact or liaisons are not enough is the creation of a “Task Force”, 
which is a “temporary committee composed of representatives from each department 
affected by a problem” (Daft, 2001, p. 37). Therefore, each can collaborate, and at the 
same time, obtain information required for each organization or sub region. The character 
of the organization would be temporal and based on a specific requirement. Other options 
that facilitate the linkage mentioned by Daft (2001) consist of assigning a “Full-time 
Integrator” to facilitate the process, or a “Team” to solve specific problems for a longer 
period (p. 38). In the region, this possibility would allow collaboration among various 
organizations and sub regions that otherwise would not occur. Also, especially important 
is the possibility that liaisons or integrators could be assigned to facilitate that process. 
The possibility of considering the creation of a special “Task Force” or “Team” to solve 
or study a specific problem about international terrorism or their related activities is also 
very important.  
This structure facilitates the cooperation among the affected states 
and organizations, and can focus on specific areas of common interest about related 
activities by using the existent regional agreements and organizations that deal with 
international terrorism and its related activities. The importance of this structure is that it 
represents a process more than a bureaucratic apparatus, and only requires the use of the 
existent organizations linked by interpersonal relations and the use of the information 
technology to facilitate contacts.   
Any organization that works to collaborate to increase security 
against international terrorism and its related activities must be designed to prevent a 
surprise attack. This also includes analyzing the use and innovation in weapons, target 
selection, and deception. Sharing of information about international terrorism requires a 
process more than a structure. The obstacles faced by regional security organizations that 
deal with international terrorism in terms of sharing information could be solved with this 
proposed organization-process. The information relevant to terrorism requires special 
treatment considering the implications for the security for each state in the region. The  
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nature of this activity requires international agreements related to international terrorism 
which must have the correspondent oversight and approval from each state in order to 
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V. USE OF GAME THEORY TO ANALYZE INFORMATION 
SHARING ABOUT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
International terrorism represents a threat to the international community, and 
especially the illicit associated activities, which affect the security of the states of the 
region. The existence of terrorism in Latin America is deeply rooted and still is present in 
the region. In addition, new extra regional international terrorism uses the region for their 
support activities and has the potential to reach the United States.  
The analysis of international terrorism requires a broad approach; therefore, the 
use of every tool to analyze this kind of threat is important. This chapter uses game 
theory to demonstrate the possible interactions of the international terrorist organizations 
and the affected states. The use of modeling to analyze terrorism is not new, and as 
mentioned by Smith (2001), as terrorist activities  “become more complex, leaders need 
more powerful tools to help them manage, understand, and penetrate this complexity” (p. 
1). Smith (2001) also observes that the activities of international terrorist organizations 
cannot be represented in one simple model. The use of modeling and simulations includes 
a diversity of variables that can support the decision process for combating terrorism and 
the model considers possible outcomes based on the availability of information.  
Trying to analyze the interaction of all the actors involved in terrorist activities is 
a complex process. Game theory provides an alternative that facilitates this process 
because it “is used to figure out what it is likely to happen in a strategic interaction” 
(Camerer, 2003, p. 7). Game theory facilitates developing strategies and analyzing 
possible rational choices to obtain preferred outcomes. Game theory can demonstrate the 
necessity for sharing information about international terrorism among the states of the 
region (Camerer, 2003).    
B. SITUATION 
The historical background and actual conditions in the region do not facilitate 
complete cooperation among the nations. The lack of a common response to terrorism 
represents a challenge to the affected states to obtain information on international 
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terrorism and its related activities. The role of the various agencies responsible for this 
differs in each state. This situation complicates the exchange of information in a timely 
manner. This problem is partially solved through informal contacts, the use of 
international organizations, mutual agreements and private enterprises. The lack of a 
formal procedure may have implications for the state and for the international community 
when considering legal prosecution of terrorists. Another consideration is that of time. A 
thorough analysis is not as important as the imperative to transfer information quickly 
when dealing with international terrorism. Usually, it would be relatively easy to share 
that information when it is not sensitive to the sponsor state but critical to the potential 
target state.  Finally, the effects of international terrorism go further than the normal 
expectations of an external threat. As a result, the information to avoid or neutralize a 
terrorist attack requires different treatment due to the potential effects of that action, such 
as the case of WMD or any act that generates great social and political chaos.   
The variables considered for the game are based on the information in the 
previous chapters of this thesis that refers to the perception of the threat, the 
characteristics of international terrorism, the international terrorist organizations, the state 
security systems, the international organizations, and the necessity of sharing information 
about this kind of threat. The game makes it possible to consider the role of the actors, 
the impact of information sharing, and the affect that terrorism can exert on any state. 
This chapter analyzes the case of Colombia as a target state and some neighbor States, 
taking into account the Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) as an international terrorist 
organization.            
The use of game theory for the present model will base the analysis in 
suppositions that pretend to reflect the real situation in this regard, and obtain the more 
likely outcomes. The model uses cardinal values in the variables and allows presenting 
the most likely outcome related to the importance of sharing information about 
international terrorism among the states and organizations. The model permits a 
continued adaptation of the variables according to the changes and different 
circumstances existent in international terrorist activities and the implicated actors. 
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1. Definitions for the Game 
 
Actors The Target State, Sponsor State, Neighbor State, and the 
International Terrorist Organization 
Target State The State, coalition, allies or organizations, potentially affected by 
international terrorist activities. 
Sponsor State The State where the International Terrorist Organization develops 
their activities directly related to terrorist acts or support activities. It 
does not necessarily mean that the State supports the International 
Terrorist Organization. 
Neighbor State  
 
The Sponsor State that is directly or indirectly connected with the 
Target State due to the activities of the International Terrorism 
Organization, which is accessible or shares physical borders. It has 
to be considered the actual means of transportation and 




Constitutes a terrorist organization, with an international presence 
and their related activities. Those organizations in the region are 
considered as non-state actors. 
Need for  
Information 
It will depend on the perception of the threat and the potential 
expected damage, including the use of all the possible actions of a 
State to obtain that information. 
Threat  
for the game 
It will be considered an inducement to force an action. It has to be 
credible. 
Promise  
for the game 
It will be considered an inducement to generate a needed action. It 
has to be credible. 
International  
Organizations 
The International Organization and the correspondent legislation, 
any agreement related to international terrorism or their related 
activities with jurisdiction in the region.  
 
C. THE GAME: SHARING OF INFORMATION BETWEEN A TARGET 
AND A SPONSOR STATE ABOUT AN INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST 
ORGANIZATION OR ASSOCIATED ACTIVITIES 
The game analyzes the possible outcomes. The game considers the case of 
international terrorism in the region originated by an internal or external terrorist 
organization. The model represents all the extreme positions, which are not necessarily 
present in the region, but must be considered for the purpose of the game. The variables 
can represent a wide range of possibilities, and could be adapted according to the 




1. Variables Related to the Actors 
a. Target State  
 
Table 1. Perception of the International Terrorist Organization (PT), According to 





Perception of the International Terrorist Organization (PT) related to the 
Target State, and International Organizations (IO). 
4  (PT) Priority threat. It is capable of affecting the Target State and allies. 
Confirmed links with other International Terrorist Organizations. Strong 
support from existent network of illicit activities 
 (IO) Sponsor State complies and promotes activities in the international 
community against terrorism. Facilitate the integration of agencies and sharing 
of information. The correspondent legal and political framework exists to act 
with the priority that requires this type of threat. 
3  (PT) Important. Possibility of links with another International Terrorist 
Organizations and involvement in criminal activities.  
 (IO) Sponsor State adheres to the agreements primarily as a political posture. 
International cooperation is occasional and not integrated with all the agencies. 
The process of sharing information is bureaucratic and the security system is in 
the process of improvement. 
2  (PT) Not important, it generates political implications. The Sponsor State does 
not consider those activities that affect the State. There is the possible presence 
of the threat because of these sorts of conditions. 
 (IO) Sponsor State partially complies with international agreements. 
International cooperation is obtained only by request and requires some 
inducements. The process of sharing information is not established and the 
security agencies are not completely trustworthy.  
1  (PT) Fear to the International Terrorist Organization. Sponsor State does 
not want to act against those activities. Consider that any action will generate 
repercussions. Facilitate the activities of the threat.  
 (IO) Sponsor State refuses to cooperate. It does not comply with international 
agreements and neither does it cooperates on any level with the other states 
about this kind of threat.  
 
Table 2. Security and Government Agencies (SA) of the Sponsor State and the 




Security and Government Agencies (SA), and Accessibility to Information 
about the International Terrorist Organization in the Sponsor State (AI). 
4  (SA)  Security and government agencies capable and completely integrated 
within the state and with international agencies. 
 (AI) International Organizations and Target State establishes a network with 
the Sponsor State for control through legal and security channels. There is a 
timely and complete flow of information. 




Security and Government Agencies (SA), and Accessibility to Information 
about the International Terrorist Organization in the Sponsor State (AI). 
internally nor externally. 
 (AI) International Organizations and Target State establish relationship 
through official channels, and look for contact with other local organizations. 
There is a limited legal framework to deal with International Terrorism, and a 
lack of an appropriate flow of information. 
2  (SA) Security and government agencies not capable and not integrated 
internally nor externally 
 (AI) International Organizations and Target State contact other organizations 
and make indirect approaches to security and government agencies. Limited 
legal cooperation and flow of information, which is not reliable. 
1  (SA) Security and government agencies controlled or possible infiltrated by 
the International Terrorist Organization. Society is easily influenced in favor 
of the International Terrorist Organization. 
 (AI) International Organizations and Target State prioritizes the use of threat 
or indirect approach or covert actions to obtain information. The internal 
political and legal systems are favorable to the threat. There is not a favorable 
environment for international cooperation.  
 
b. Sponsor State/Neighbor State 
 
Table 3. The Influence of the International Terrorist Organization (IT), in Relation 




The influence of the International Terrorist Organization (IT) in relation to the 
Posture of the Sponsor State.  
4  (IT) Sponsor State fears the International Terrorism Organization. Sponsor 
State does not want to act against that threat nor their associated activities. Any 
action taken by the government will have political and social implications due to 
that influence. That will facilitate the threat to continue their activities.  
3  (IT) Sponsor State does not consider important the activities of the 
International Terrorist Organization, which generates a soft political posture for 
this kind of action. This posture allows possible activities that support the 
International Terrorist Organizations. 
2  (IT) Sponsor State considers important the activities of international terrorism, 
but only as a delinquency activity. Possibility to have links with other Terrorist 
Organizations and involvement in criminal activities within the Sponsor State. A 
social demand is present for the visible problems, related to security that 
generates those related activities.  
1  (IT) Sponsor State considers the activities of international terrorism as a priority 
threat capable of affecting the state, a Target State, different organizations, and 
allies. That risk demands complete cooperation and presents a social and political 






Table 4. The Need for Information (NI) of the Target State about the Activities of 




The Need for Information (NI) of the Target State about the activities of the 
International Terrorism Organization in the Sponsor State. 
4  (NI) Urgent requirement for information due to the influence of the threat, and the 
increment of activities in the Sponsor State. Confirmed links with other illicit 
organizations and other possible terrorist attempts. The Target State uses all sorts 
of means to obtain that information, including international organizations. 
3  (NI) Important need for information, legal prosecution, and the social demand of 
the Target State to solve that security concern. Prioritize the use of a direct 
approach to obtain cooperation of the Sponsor State. 
2  (NI) Target State requires information to increase security. Considers only the use 
of official channels to obtain information about the International Terrorist 
Organization in the Sponsor State.  
1  (NI) The information required by the Target State about the International 
Terrorist Organization is not considered a priority and is mostly channeled 
through a third party, such as an allied state or an Organization.  
 
D. USE OF GAME THEORY ASSOCIATED WITH THE IMPORTANCE OF 
SHARING INFORMATION ABOUT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 
ORIGINATED BY SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES FROM THE 
REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA (FARC). 
The purpose of this model is to analyze the importance of sharing information 
about the FARC from Colombia in relation to the neighbor states. The case considers the 
possible actions that Colombia as the Target State and the neighbor states could assume, 
associated with the activities of that terrorist organization. The game considers as 
Sponsor States, the Neighbor Countries of the region from where the International 
Terrorist Organization could operate or conduct support activities. The Threat in this 
particular case consists of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which 
has an international presence and strong links to illicit activities on a different scale in the 
Neighbor States that serve to maintain the capacity of the organization. The variables 
considered for the game are based on assumptions, which lead the actors to develop their 
own strategy to obtain or negate information.     
1. Colombia 
This state has endured a struggle against subversives groups for more than 40 
years. The FARC is the major group that operates in the country. The group has the 
ability to obtain international presence political support for its cause that affects the  
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internal security of the Neighbor States. Colombia considers it vital to obtain information 
on the activities of the FARC in the Neighbor States and promotes regional and bilateral 
agreements to obtain information about those activities. 
2. The FARC and the Neighbor States  
The activities of the FARC in the Neighbor States are considered terrorist actions 
in those States. The activities of the FARC in the Neighbor States, could affect their 
international relations, and influence in internal politics. The game is based on the 
possible postures of the FARC in the neighbor states, assuming the expansion of their 
illicit activities as a priority in support of the political-military structure of the 
organization in Colombia. In this case, the cardinal values could be assigned based on the 
analysis of the variables for the Target and Neighbor States affected by terrorist activities.   
3. Colombia-Target State, and the Neighbor States (Affected Directly or 
Indirectly by the FARC) 
 





of the variables of 
the game 
 




(IO) Organization  
and International 
Agreements with 
the Neighbor State 








the analysis of the 
variables.  
 
(Range from 2 to 
8).  
Ranking of the 
Colombian more 
likely outcomes 
4 4 6 First Best Outcome 
3 3 5 Second Best 
Outcome 
2 2 4 Third Outcome 









Table 6. The Neighbor States, Considering the Influence of the FARC. 
 
Neighbor State  Neighbor State: 
value of the 
variables of the 
game 
 
(IT) Influence of 
the FARC and the 





the activities of the 




the analysis of the 
variables.  
(Range from 2 to 
8). 




4 4 7 First Best Outcome 
3 3 5 Second Best 
Outcome 
2 2 3 Third Outcome 
1 1 2 Worst Outcome 
 
a. Colombia (Target State) Preferences 




Sharing of information about the activities 
associated with the FARC by the Neighbor State. 
First Best Outcome 6 Colombia and Neighbor State maintain complete 




5 Colombia and the Neighbor State maintain 
cooperation only through formal channels to control 
possible activities associated with the FARC. 
Third Outcome 4 Colombia does not have access to information and is 
not allowed in the Neighbor State. The information 
is handled by the Neighbor State; therefore, it is not 
completely credible. 
Worst Outcome 2 Neighbor State fears the FARC and is forced to 
support or tolerate their activities. The information is 
limited and non-credible. Colombia in forced to 
obtain information through different means. 
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b. Neighbor State (Sponsor State) Preferences, Considering the 
Influence of the FARC 
 




Influence of the FARC in the Neighbor State and 
Colombia’s requirement of information. 
First Best 
Outcome 
7 Neighbor State fears the FARC and is forced to support 
or tolerate its activities. The information is limited and 
non-credible.  
Colombia is forced to obtain information related to the 
FARC in the Neighbor State by any means. 
Second Best 
Outcome 
5 The Neighbor State does not control all the activities of 
the FARC within his state; nor allows any collaboration 
from Colombia. The information responds only to 
specific requirements. Colombia searches for agreements 
and contacts with the Neighbor State to obtain 
information about the FARC. 
Third Outcome 3 Colombia and the Neighbor State maintain cooperation 
only through formal channels to control the activities of 
the FARC. 
The security agencies maintain limited contacts through 
formal channels. 
Worst Outcome 2 Colombia and the Neighbor State maintain complete 
cooperation and exert control over the activities of the 
FARC. 
The security agencies of Colombia establish a network 
with the Neighbor State for sharing information about the 
activities related to the FARC. 
 
4. Explication 
The game analyzes the relationship between Colombia (Target State) and the 
Neighbor State, considering the influence of the FARC as an International Terrorist 
Organization acting against the Neighbor State.  
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a. Matrix of the Game  
 
Table 9. Matrix of the Game 
 
Neighbor State Information sharing about 
the FARC Share 
Information(C) 




               2 
   6 
               5 






              
                3 
   5 
                
                  7 
   2 
 
b. Nash Equilibrium 
(1) Finding Dominant Strategies. Colombia 
 
Table 10. Colombia: Dominant Strategy 
 
Neighbor State Information sharing about 
the FARC Share 
Information(C) 
Influence by 
the FARC (D) 
Share 
Information (A) 
                
   6 
               






                
   5 
                
   2 
 
Colombia Security Level  : 4 
Colombia Goal   : Maximize his outcome 
Neighbor State Goal.   : Minimize the Colombia’s outcome 
Colombia dominant strategy  : To Share Information. 
 47
(2) Neighbor State. Influenced by the FARC 
Table 11. Neighbor State: Dominant Strategy 
 
Neighbor State Information sharing about 
the FARC Share 
Information(C) 
Influenced by 
the FARC (D) 
Share 
Information (A) 
               2 
    
               5 





               3 
    
               7 
    
Neighbor State Security Level : 5 
Neighbor State Goal   : Maximize his outcomes against Colombia 
Colombia Goal:    Minimize outcome Neighbor State    
Neighbor State dominant strategy : Influenced by the FARC.  
 
Likely Outcome    AD (4, 5) 
 
(3) Conclusion.  The Dominant Strategy of Colombia is to 
Share Information (A). The Dominant Strategy of the Neighbor State is influenced by the 
FARC (D). Both have their dominant strategies at point AD (4, 5). No one can gain by 
departing unilaterally from its strategy associated with an outcome.  
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Figure 2.   Parapeto Optimal, Nash Arbitration Point. 
 
(5) Pareto Optimal: BD-AC. The Nash Arbitration Point 
(NAP) located at AD (4, 5), which is the optimal solution. It is on the Pareto Optimal 
line. Therefore, every outcome means that there are no options for moves, which would 
give both players a higher outcome, or give one player the same payoff but the other 
player a higher payoff. (The game is a zero-sum game)  




























5. Strategic Moves 
Colombia  : Dominant strategy – Share Information 
Neighbor State : Dominant strategy – Influenced by FARC 
Likely outcome : BD (4, 5) 
 
a. From Colombia’s Perspective (Influenced by the FARC) 
First move 
If Colombia A, Neighbor State D → (4, 5) 
If Colombia B, Neighbor State D → (2, 7) → The best outcome for Neighbor State, 
Colombia won’t do this first move. 
If Neighbor State C, Colombia A → (6, 2) → The best for Colombia, but Neighbor State 
won’t do this first move. 
If Neighbor State D, Colombia A → (4, 5) 
Conclusion: no first move 
Threat for the game: Colombia wants C 
If Neighbor State does D, then Colombia B → (5, 3) 
Conclusion: No, Threat. Helps the Neighbor State. 
Promise for the game: Colombia wants C 
If Neighbor State does C, then Colombia B → (2, 7)  
Promise: Yes, improves Neighbor State → (5, 3) 
Conclusion: No promise, does not work alone 
 
b. From Neighbor State’s Perspective 
First move 
If Neighbor State C, Colombia A → (6, 2)  
If Neighbor State D, Colombia A → (4, 5) 
If Colombia A, Neighbor State D → (4, 5)   
If Colombia B, Neighbor State D → (2, 7)  
Conclusion: No first move 
Threat for the game: Neighbor State wants B 
If Colombia does A, then Neighbor State C → (6, 2) 
Conclusion: No, Threat, helps Colombia  
Promise for the game: Neighbor State wants B 
If Colombia does B, then Neighbor State C → (5, 3) 
Promise: Yes  
Conclusion: Exists promise, but (5, 3) is worse than (4, 5)   
Neighbor State has a First Move → (4, 5) 
 
c. Conclusion 
The game theory allows establishing the more likely outcomes for the  
actors. The variables can be considered for the actors according to the changing  
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circumstances. In this case, Colombia was considered as the target state and the neighbor 
states were considered because of the influence and activities of the FARC in those 
states, and the repercussions to Colombia. 
The influence of the FARC in Colombia and the neighbor states is based 
on the sharing of information, which also is affected by the importance that the actors 
assign to the activities of the FARC. Furthermore, it could be affected by the influence or 
pressure that the FARC exert in terms of security against the actors, specially the 
neighbor states.  
The final analysis of the game is based on the capacity of Colombia and 
the neighbor state to share information in order to reduce the influence of the FARC. The 
final result of the game (according to the value assigned to the variables considering the 
actual circumstances) is that Colombia’s dominant strategy is to share information while 
the neighbor state dominant strategy is influenced by the FARC.   
Under these circumstances, the position of Colombia will be to increase 
bilateral, regional, and international agreements in order to secure cooperation against the 
FARC in the neighbor countries. Meanwhile, the FARC will increase their influence in 
order to discourage the neighbor state from cooperating.  
Neither Colombia nor the Neighbor State has the apparent first move 
which could change the decisions made without communications. Both sides do not have 
a clear promise or threat. In this case, considering these assumptions, it demonstrated the 
role of the actors and the possible outcomes based on proposed variables. The use of 
promises or threats in the game, will be only effective when considering complete 
cooperation and the sharing of the necessary information to eliminate misperceptions 
about some actions that the states (neighbor or target state) could assume to confront the 
threat representing the terrorist organization. The model allows for assuming different 
possibilities to understand the actions of each actor, and overcome the limitations through 
the exchange of information about the capacities of the threat among the security forces 
of the states, and the use of the international organizations when needed. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The process of information sharing about international terrorism in Latin America 
requires a broad perception because it must include some particular characteristics of the 
region when considering international terrorism. Initially, it is important to reflect on how 
international terrorism is perceived in the region as a new threat, and the priority assigned 
to the security of each state. The analysis of the threats in the region in this regard is 
important because the threats linked with international terrorism have changed.  
The problem of sharing information increases when the threat of international 
terrorism still is not recognized, and accordingly, not considered a priority, or 
furthermore, the conditions exist for the illicit activities which aids terrorism, through the 
use of criminal structures. It is important to consider that security structures in the region 
are not fully integrated to allow the sharing of information for security and law 
enforcement purposes. The security structures of the region that deal with information 
about terrorism are in the process of overcoming internal problems previously linked with 
misuse and the lack of control from the political and legal systems.   
This is important to consider since international agreements are in existence. 
However, enforcement and cooperation are still ongoing. The threat of international 
terrorism grows particularly in states where criminal activities are high. Therefore, 
improvements in a common understanding of the risk of this sort of threat will facilitate 
cooperation based on already existent agreements, which include the sharing of 
information.  
The initial approach to the problem from an international perspective has not 
reached a regional agreement, which is usually derived from the perception of the role 
and interests of the United States. This constitutes a problem when trying to establish a 
common agreement on international terrorism that only had functioned in bilateral 
agreements, such as is the case of the United States and Colombia, and bilateral and sub 
regional agreements in the case of the countries from the Tri Border Area.  
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This is important to consider because it could determine the possible actions that 
the states would need to take to solve the requirement of information according to the 
results from the potential threat that international terrorism represents to all states.    
In this case, the potential capacity of a non-state threat (such as international 
terrorism) increases because it can maintain the initiative even with limited resources. 
Meanwhile, the opportunities to use conventional and traditional responses from political, 
economic to military sources diminish. This requires the study of the risks terrorism 
represents to the security of the region’s states.  
Therefore, the necessity for cooperation and improvement of the intelligence 
services is a priority for being prepared to confront international terrorism. In this regard, 
international cooperation on intelligence matters and sharing of information represents an 
important part of the solution against international terrorism. The knowledge of culture, 
language, relationships, and so forth, cannot be improvised and requires time. Therefore, 
only international cooperation can help to overcome those limitations. 
The process of sharing information requires understanding the potential of 
international terrorism as a threat to the existence of the state. Consequently, the 
proposed structure for cooperation constitutes a basis for planning mutual support among 
the security organizations in each particular sub region, including occasional support of 
special teams for specific requirements. The use of integrators also facilitates the process 
of sharing all kinds of information related to international terrorism.   
In order to be prepared for the new phase of international terrorism in the war 
against terrorism, the role of information is unique. The necessity of information for any 
decision is critical and for the use of force at any level, vital. The information process, in 
order to produce a timely decision, requires international cooperation. Limitations on 
cooperation, could lead the target states to use unconventional actions in order to obtain 
that required information. The risks on inaction are too great.    
The game theory facilitates analyzing the process of sharing information by 
adapting variables of the game to each particular necessity, which helps to avoid the 
normal bias when considering this complex threat. Game theory also facilitates 
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understanding the likely strategic decisions of the states, and the impact of information. 
This particular approach makes it possible to put the importance of sharing information 
into perspective to support a political decision, especially in this region where the socio 
political and security environment requires thorough understanding and cooperation to 
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